Firm j offers a product j at unit cost c j and price p j Integer capacity Y j ≥ 0 → remaining capacity y j ≥ 0 g p y j ≥ g p y y j ≥ N: total # of consumers s: # of consumer segments Nr: initial segment r capacity Nr: initial segment r capacity (N = ∑ s r=1 N r ) A i i i i f fi d As consumers acquire items, capacities of firms and market segments are deployed
Basic Model Elements
Telecom Service/Policy5
a trj : consumer perception of quality or value of the d product ϵ trj : random variable with mean zero j B trj = a trj + ϵ tr : valuation of product j at time t by segment r consumer g β r ∈ [0, 1]: degree of strategic behavior β = 0: consumer completely disregards the β r = 0: consumer completely disregards the possibility of future purchase (myopic) β 1 l h h h β r = 1: consumer values the current purchase the same as at any point in the future (strategic)
Modelling Assumptions
Modelling Assumptions (i) Information Availability
Perfect information: Firms and consumers have perfect knowledge of all market information (remaining capacities, market segments, and distributional and parametric characteristics) Zero information cost: Information relevant for decisions is available at no cost (ii) Rationality P f t f i ht All k t ti i t hi ti t d Perfect foresight: All market participants are sophisticated (they anticipate the strategic behavior and compute resulting event probabilities and expected payoffs) event probabilities and expected payoffs)
Modelling Assumptions
Demand as a counting process: Aggregate demand from each segment is a counting gg g g g process with intensity dependent on market conditions such as time, price, and so on.
, p , Each segment process is a sum of independent demand process originating from individual demand process originating from individual consumers
Shopping intensity control: Consumers respond to k b lli h i i i i market by controlling shopping intensities Maximum shopping intensity: A maximum Maximum shopping intensity: A maximum probability of consumer's eagerness to acquire a particular product It is same for all consumers particular product. It is same for all consumers
Modelling Assumptions (iv) Choice Model
Intensity allocation as a choice model: Consumers allocate their shopping intensity among products according to a discrete-choice model with the outside alternative of delay in future
Valuation are known up to their distribution: Given the cons mer's segment the state of his/her al ation the consumer's segment, the state of his/her valuation is known only as a distribution rather than a specific value (applies both to firms and all consumers) value (applies both to firms and all consumers)
Consumer perceptions are conditional on purchase: f h h h di ib i f l i After the purchase, the distribution of valuations perceived by the consumers is the conditional l i di ib i l i h h h d valuation distributional given that the purchased product is preferred to any other option. 
The Competitive Game
Move of the firms p(t, y, n) = (p 1 (t,y,n), …, p m (t,y,n))
Probability that a unit of product j is sold to and individual consumer of segment r consumer of segment r λ rj (t,y,n,p)
Probability of no sale 1 -∑ n λ (t y n p) 1 -∑ r,j n r λ rj (t,y,n,p)
Maximum shopping intensity λ rj (t,y,n,p) ≤ λ for all t,r,j and (y,n,p) Si f di ti ti Size of discretization λmN (sufficiently small compared to 1: probability of more than one purchase in a given decision period is negligible)
Probability of segment r consumer choosing product j at given price p = (p p ) given price p = (p 1 , …, p m )
Expected surplus of a representative myopic consumer in segment r Certainty equivalent of a future purchase, at time t, Certainty equivalent of a future purchase, at time t, information state (y, n, p) as evaluated by segment r consumer consumer Q r (t, y, n, p) : certainty equivalent of a future purchase ( l f th ti f d l i h ) (value of the option of delaying purchase)
Segment r strategic consumer chooses product j with probability P(B tr ∈ A rj (t, y, n, p)) where
The response of any of the n r segment r = 1, …, s consumer in info state (y, n, p) are λ rj (t,y,n,p) = λP(B tr ∈A rj (t, y, n, p)) 
(2) Expected Utility of a Future Purchase Expected utility of a segment r consumer in info state (y n) and (y n p) at time t (y, n) and (y, n, p) at time t U r (t, y, n) and U r (t, y, n, p)
At the end of planning horizon consumers have the expected utility of 0 consumers have the expected utility of 0 U r (T, y, n) = 0 for all r and (y, n)
If the firms run out of capacity, expected utilities are 0 U (t 0 n) = 0 for all t r n U r (t, 0, n) 0 for all t, r, n
4. The Competitive Game p * (t, y, n): equilibrium strategy profile U r (t, y, n) = E[U r (t, y, n, p * (t, y, n))]
To complete recursion, need to find U r (t, y, n, p) as a function of expected utilities at time t+1 function of expected utilities at time t+1 There is a mechanism that selects an equilibrium to be implemented by the firms if G(t y n) has multiple be implemented by the firms if G(t, y, n) has multiple equilibria. This mechanism ensures that equilibriumAveraging Behavior assume that a strategic consumers behaves as follows: first, a consumer determines his/her optimal shopping , p p p g intensity second consumer averages those intensities second, consumer averages those intensities
Generalization of the Choice Model
Proposition 3 decision period t, suppose that there exists a unique equilibrium in all subsequent periods.
Then the equilibrium response of any of the n r consumers in segment r info state (y n p) consumers in segment r, info state (y, n, p) (x * rj (t, y, n, p, B tr ): optimal shopping intensity )
for q=∞ (multiple) x * rj (t, y, n, p, B tr ) = I(B trj -p j ≥ β r U r (t+1, y, n)), j = 1, …, m j , , for q=1 (specific) for q=1 (specific) x * rj (t, y, n, p, B tr ) = I(B tr -p j ∈ A rj (t, y, n, p)), j = 1, …, m
Corollary 2 Let q = ∞ and consider decision time period t, and suppose that there exists a unique equilibrium in all subsequent time periods. Then, the demand intensity for product j from segment r in info state (y, n, p) is D rj (t, y, n, p)=nr P(B trj -p j ≥ β r U r (t+1, y, n))
Corollary 3 Under conditions of Corollary 2, expected future y , p profit of firm j is separable in the components of p for all j = 1, …, m p j , ,
Theorem 2 For the case q = ∞ and under assumptions (A) and (B), there exists a Markov-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies Theorem 3
For the case q = ∞ s = 1 and for all t the distribution For the case q ∞, s 1, and for all t, the distribution of B tr satisfies the assumptions of (C 
Percentage of revenue difference-effect of strategic
g f ff g behavior as the percentage difference in revenues between the strategic and purely myopic cases for each g p y y p firm relative the myopic case. 
Managerial Insight from Numerical Illustrations

g g
In competitive situations, the largest differences in revenue occur when the firms divide the market when the firms divide the market Reason-when consumers are myopic and the market size is increased proportionally with the number of firms there is a increased proportionally with the number of firms there is a noticeable increase in revenues Increases are made possible by the stochastic nature of the market because the firms have more opportunities to set higher prices when they face a market of proportionally larger size despite the when they face a market of proportionally larger size despite the presence of competitors Dependency of result On the stochastic nature of the market Information availability
Managerial Insight from Numerical Illustrations
Telecom Service/Policy5 g g (3) Losses from Deviating from equilibrium by wrongly i th t th i assuming that the consumers are myopic Examining three situations g
Telecom Service/Policy5 g g Result Strong firm is generally less affected by deviation than the weak firm or the firm in symmetric scenario The losses decrease when N increase and there is more intense competition between the consumers p
Conclusion
Most restrictive assumptions "information availability" i h i i To improve the situation Firms to learn characteristics of the market as time progresses and continuously adjust the optimal pricing policy Incorporation of consumer learning will provide a more realistic representation of consumer behavior p
